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activities that would be affected by the Tribe's imposition of water
quality standards.
The court first addressed Wisconsin's argument that the Lake was
not within the reservation's borders. The court ruled that Wisconsin
waived this argument on appeal because the state did not raise it to the
EPA in the original proceeding.
In reaching its decision as to the second argument, the court
assumed Wisconsin had title to the lakebed. It ruled, however, that
Congress has ultimate authority to regulate the navigable waters of the
United States. Further, the Constitution vests the federal government
with exclusive authority over relations with Indian tribes. Because
Wisconsin's ownership of the lakebeds would not preclude the federal
government from regulating those waters, the court ruled Wisconsin
could not complain about the federal government allowing a tribe to
do so.
As to Wisconsin's final argument, the court held upstream, offreservation dischargers conducting economically valuable activities to
the state must ensure those activities do not result in contamination of
the downstream on-reservation waters. This is true even if compliance
effectively prohibited the activity altogether. The court stated once a
tribe is given TAS status, it has the same right as that given to states to
object to permits issued for upstream off-reservation activities. Since
Illinois, for example, would have the right to regulate upstream
dischargers in Wisconsin, so too did the Tribe. The court thus
affirmed the district court's ruling, holding the EPA's grant of TAS
status to the tribe was appropriate.
Brian L. Martin
United States v. Alshabkhoun, 277 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2002) (affirming
the district court's finding of A&A farms liable for violating the Clean
Water Act, and upholding the penalties assessed as reasonable).
A&A Farms ("A&A") owned 1,000 acres of farmland adjacent to
the Wisconsin River. The farm constructed a drainage ditch to collect
water and soil from the land, which was then conveyed to the river.
A&A did not obtain a permit from the United States prior to
constructing the ditch. Consequently, the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") issued an administrative compliance order stating that
construction of the ditch, absent a permit, violated the Clean Water
Act ("CWA"). The CWA prohibits the discharge of any pollutant,
including dredged or fill material, into navigable waters of the United
States, except in accordance with a permit. Thus, the United States
filed this suit against A&A under section 309 of the CWA. The district
court entered partial summary judgment in favor of the government,
and the parties entered into a Consent Decree ("Decree") to restore
the wetlands.
The Decree was negotiated by both parties and approved by the
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district court. The Decree required A&A to pay $225,000 in penalties
and to restore the wetlands according to an agreed upon schedule. It
also allowed for deadline extensions if a Force Majeure prevented or
delayed performance. Furthermore, A&A was required to give written
notification of any alleged Force Majeure to invoke the provision. The
decree also included a dispute resolution provision providing for the
accrual of penalties during the proceedings unless A&A successfully
filed a petition to stay its obligation to pay any penalty regarding the
disputed matters.
A&A began restoration of the wetlands in November of 1999,
subsequently filing a notice of dispute with the EPA in February of
2000.
A&A requested relief from the decree, asserting that
compliance was impossible.
The EPA denied relief to A&A.
Thereafter, A&A filed a Petition to Modify the degree with the district
court. The court denied the petition and ordered A&A to pay fines
amounting to $507,850.40. A&A appealed.
A&A conceded that its construction of the ditch violated the CWA,
however, it contended that the district court's enforcement of the
Decree violated public policy on two grounds. A&A first asserted that
the Decree's penalty provision violated public policy because it allowed
penalties to accrue while the parties engaged in dispute resolution
proceedings. Second, A&A asserted that the district court erred in
penalizing A&A for non-compliance of the Decree because a flood in
June of 2002 constituted a Force Majeure event under the Decree.
First, the appellate court noted that a Decree is a court order that
embodies the terms agreed upon by the parties as a compromise to
litigation. Further, for purposes of construction, ajudicially approved
decree is essentially a contract. The court observed, however, that a
provision within a decree that fixes a stipulated penalty is
unenforceable if it constitutes an unreasonable penalty or is void as a
matter of public policy. A&A asserted that based on United States v.
Witco, the stipulated penalty provision in the decree forced it to
surrender its rights to invoke dispute resolution because penalties
would accrue while the dispute was pending. The court stated that
Witco, a Delaware federal court decision, was not "controlling
authority" and was distinguishable from A&A's case. The court
remarked that in Witco, the required clean-up was completed before
the dispute resolution clause was invoked and the accrued penalties at
issue were unrelated to any continuing environmental violation. In
contrast, A&A invoked the dispute resolution procedures before the
required clean-up was completed. Thus, A&A's penalties accrued
because of its unwarranted delay in restoring the wetlands, as required
by the decree. The court reasoned that the Decree was drafted and
negotiated by both parties and entered into voluntarily.
Thus, the courts held A&A liable for the penalties that accrued
during the dispute resolution proceedings because excusing A&A from
the stipulated penalties would undermine the clear terms of the
Decree and allow the parties to delay performance by invoking the
dispute resolution clause with meritless claims. Further, the court held
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that the stipulated penalties imposed under the Decree were
reasonable because the penalties directly related to the environmental
harm caused by A&A, and the amount assessed was less than 10
percent of the statutory authorized penalty.
The court addressed A&A's second argument, noting that,
although the Decree provided for the extension of deadlines in the
event of a Force Majeure, the provision required A&A to notify the
EPA in writing if it intended to invoke the provision. Therefore,
because A&A did not comply with the Decree's procedural
requirements, it could not claim impossibility. Moreover, because the
flood occurred seven months after the Decree's deadline, the court
reasoned that the flooding did not warrant an excuse for the delay
and, therefore was irrelevant. Thus, the court affirmed the district
court's judgment.
ChristopherA. Gfnffin
United States v. Chemetco, Inc., 274 F.3d 1154 (7th Cir. 2001)
(holding: (1) section 309(c) (2) of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") was
unambiguous; (2) Congress intended the number of violation days to
be a sentencing factor and not an element of a CWA offense; and (3)
the fine imposed by the district court did not exceed the prescribed
statutory maximum penalty).
Chemetco plead guilty to violating section 301 of the CWA. The
district court ordered Chemetco to pay a fine based on the number of
days it violated the CWA. Chemetco appealed its sentence, arguing
that the district court misinterpreted the CWA and that the court's
findings violated the rule set forth in Apprendi v. New Jersey.
Chemetco obtained a permit from the Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") allowing construction and operation of a
storm-water runoff control system. Chemetco also installed, without a
permit, a secret pipe running from its property to a ditch tributary.
For a period of ten years, Chemetco used the secret pipe to illegally
release water containing toxic metals, until United States and Illinois
EPA agents discovered it.
Chemetco was indicted for conspiring to violate the CWA and
knowingly violating section 301 of the CWA. After conducting an
investigation, the government recommended fining Chemetco for 949
days of violation. According to its calculations, Chemecto argued it
was only liable for 71 days of violation. Chemetco also objected to the
government's findings, citing the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Apprendi. Chemetco further claimed that the government had to
prove the number of days of violation beyond a reasonable doubt, and
it had to be charged in the indictment with each day of violation.
The district court found that the indictment was sufficient because
it informed Chemetco of the charges and put it on notice of the
potential maximum penalty. Further, the district court found that

